Title:Evolutionary vaccination dynamics under higher-order reinforcement pressure

Abstract:Vaccination games in higher-order settings remain underexplored, despite their importance in shaping opinions and collective decisions. Here, we introduce a parsimonious behavioral-epidemiological model to evaluate how peer reinforcement pressure influences vaccination uptake. The framework consists of a two-layer multiplex: an epidemic layer governed by the SIR process on a square lattice, and a behavioral layer represented by a hypergraph of triadic interactions. Individuals update their vaccination strategy via imitation, modulated by a reinforcement parameter α when peer support is present. We find that higher-order structure alone induces clusters of vaccinated individuals that act as protective barriers. Low but nonzero reinforcement (α≈0.5) maximizes coverage and suppresses outbreaks, while both negligible (α≈0) and moderate (α>0.1) reinforcement reduce uptake, as excessive confirmation lowers adaptability and enables non-vaccinators to re-emerge. Our work bridges complex contagion theory with evolutionary game dynamics, offering insights into how contact structure and peer reinforcement jointly shape vaccination behavior.